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Executive summary
Brexit means that the United Kingdom could be able to run its own trade policy, which 
opens the door for the potential negotiation of a free trade agreement between the UK and 
China. We ask three questions about this important issue for the UK-EU economic rela-
tionship. If a China-UK FTA was signed, could Chinese exporters break into the EU market 
through the UK, making a possible China-EU FTA relatively superfluous? Would a China-EU 
FTA help UK exporters to gain a competitive advantage in China relative to EU exporters? Will 
UK producers benefit by importing cheaper Chinese intermediate goods?
Our analysis indicates that a UK-China FTA will be neither easy nor clearly advanta-
geous for the UK. First, it will be difficult for the UK to reach an agreement with China without 
first establishing a new post-Brexit partnership with the EU. Negotiating tariffs with other 
WTO members will be a pre-condition if the UK exits the EU customs union, and this process 
will require time and effort. Second, even if the UK reaches an agreement with China, the UK 
cannot serve as a back door for Chinese products to enter the EU, because the EU is very likely 
use rules of origin to close any such loopholes. In addition, entering the EU via the UK will 
entail an additional transportation cost for Chinese goods that will, at least partly, offset any 
tariff savings, making use of such a loophole less worthwhile. Third, the UK and the other EU 
economies differ in most of their exports to China, so there would be very limited substitution 
between them.
It therefore seems that establishing a new trade relationship with the EU would be a 
more urgent task for the UK in the post-Brexit world, rather than an FTA with China. Under 
such circumstances, the UK might need to postpone its trade negotiations with other econo-
mies outside of EU, including China. This goes beyond the current discussion of the illegality 
of the UK starting to negotiate trade deals before it leaves the EU. The issue is whether it 
makes economic sense for the UK to do so, and the answer is no. In fact, the more the UK 
reaches an independent favourable trade agreement with China after Brexit, the harder it 
will be for the UK to strike a good deal with EU. In the meantime, it is also urgent for the UK 
to negotiate with the main WTO members on tariffs, because outside the EU, the UK might 
not participate in the EU schedule of concessions. The best strategy for the UK would be to 
negotiate with the other WTO members with the EU-based tariffs as a starting point, to avoid 
negotiating over terms separately and also to maintain a close relationship with the EU.
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1. Introduction
The United Kingdom has for long time flirted with the idea of establishing a free trade 
agreement (FTA) with China. Already in December 2013, during an official visit to China, 
the then UK prime minister David Cameron claimed he could act as a catalyser for an 
EU-China trade deal. Such a statement was not well received in Brussels, given the Com-
mission’s sole responsibility for trade policy at the EU level. Furthermore, the mood in 
Brussels was that the EU-China economic relationship was not yet balanced enough to 
engage in FTA negotiations1. 
Brexit has obviously drastically changed this picture. Brexit means that the UK could be 
able to run its own trade policy, which opens the door for the potential negotiation of an FTA 
between the UK and China. However, the UK still faces a number of constraints.
First, if Brexit means that the UK would no longer enjoy the EU’s schedule of concessions 
for goods with the World Trade Organisation, the UK would be obliged to negotiate a fresh 
schedule of concessions before any bilateral FTA. This negotiation would not be as simple as 
it might seem because its outcome would require the consent of all WTO members. In reality, 
some WTO members might want to gain more favourable terms given that the UK would have 
less negotiating power, its economy being four times smaller than the rest of the EU2. All in all, 
the process before the UK could conclude FTAs with countries such as China would be full of 
uncertainties, and most importantly, would be time consuming.
Second, even if the UK were to resolve the WTO-related hurdles and could technically 
start to negotiate an FTA with China, the type of trade partnership that the UK might even-
tually want to shape with the EU would be bound to have a bearing on its negotiations with 
China. The more the UK retains its EU trade ties through its FTA with the EU, the harder it will 
be to do the same with China. It should be noted in this regard that even those campaigning 
for the UK to leave the EU favour maintained access to the EU market through an FTA. Their 
real problem was the labour mobility aspect of the single market3. 
In the baseline scenario that the UK will pursue a trade agreement with the EU4, the ques-
tion then is how the UK will pursue an FTA with China in parallel.
We break down this important issue for the UK-EU economic relationship by asking three 
key questions. First, if an FTA between China and the UK were to be signed, would it be 
possible for Chinese exporters to break into the EU market through the UK, making a possible 
FTA between the EU and China relatively superfluous? Second, would such an FTA between 
the UK and China help UK exporters to gain a competitive advantage in China and replace the 
EU’s exports? Third, will UK producers benefit by importing cheaper Chinese intermediate 
goods and thus gain competitiveness relative to the EU?
By addressing these questions in turn, we conclude that a China-UK FTA would have a 
very limited impact on the EU’s imports. However, it would affect the EU’s exports although in 
a very asymmetric way for different EU member states. 
1  See Euractiv (2013) ‘Cameron irritates Brussels by pushing EU-China trade deal’, 3 December, available at https://
www.euractiv.com/section/uk-europe/news/cameron-irritates-brussels-by-pushing-eu-china-trade-deal/. Also see the 
European Commission (2016) ‘Elements for a new EU strategy on China’, available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-re-
lease_MEMO-16-2258_en.htm.
2  André Sapir (2016) ‘Should the UK pull out of the EU customs union?’, Bruegel Blog, 1 August, available at http://
bruegel.org/2016/08/should-the-uk-pull-out-of-the-eu-customs-union/. 
3  Sam Ashworth-Hayes (2016) ‘We won’t be in single market without free movement’, InFacts, 6 April, available at 
https://infacts.org/mythbusts/uk-wont-single-market-without-free-movement/. 
4  BBC News, ‘Five models for post-Brexit UK trade’, http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-eu-referendum-36639261. 
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2. The UK ‘back door’: no easy way for 
Chinese exporters to use the UK to enter 
the EU market
What would be the consequences for the EU of China signing an FTA with the UK while the 
UK maintains at least an FTA with the rest of Europe, if not full participation in the single 
market? This ‘status quo’ scenario should raise concerns for the EU about whether Chinese 
exports could use the UK ‘back door’ to enter the EU market without China signing a bilateral 
FTA with the EU. The answer really depends on what type of trade agreement the UK and the 
EU reach following Brexit.
If the UK were to maintain EU single market status, there would be virtually no inspections 
of products transferred from the UK to other EU countries. In this circumstance, a favour-
able FTA between China and the UK would become a true back door for Chinese products 
to enter the EU market. The irony of this push factor for the UK to rush into an agreement 
with China is that it could actually make it harder for the UK to retain full access to the EU 
single market, with an outcome that would probably be more costly (surely as far as financial 
services are concerned) than the gains from an FTA with China. There is however a halfway 
option, as illustrated by the Swiss example. Switzerland is not in the EU but has reached a 
number of FTAs with the EU in the context of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA). 
At the same time, Switzerland has also established FTAs with 38 partners outside the EU, 
including China5. To prevent non-EU imports from entering the EU market through Switzer-
land, the EFTA states such as Switzerland must apply rules of origin that show to what extent 
a certain good is produced and processed within the European Economic Area (EEA) in order 
to enjoy preferential tariffs, otherwise normal tariffs apply6. The same type of rule has also 
been included in the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) between the 
EU and Canada, which is yet to come into force7. Following these precedents, it is very likely 
that the EU would apply rules of origin to the flow of goods between the UK and the EU. These 
measures will thus make it difficult for Chinese corporates to use the UK back door to enter 
the EU market.
In addition, international transportation of goods from China through the UK to EU 
countries will be handicapped by additional transportation costs. Goods sent from China to 
Europe mainly travel by sea, with maritime transportation accounting for nearly 60 per-
cent of China’s international trade8. Unlike air or road transportation, long-distance mar-
itime transportation must follow specific routes to minimise time and costs. Table 1 lists 
the main shipping routes from China to Europe, as provided by the China Ocean Shipping 
Company (COSCO), a major Chinese global carrier company. Most container ships from 
China to Europe dock at the ports of Antwerp, Hamburg and Rotterdam, with more limited 
volumes going through Felixstowe and Southampton in the UK (Table 1). As Felixstowe and 
Southampton, two of the UK’s major ports for Chinese ships, only rank as the seventh and 
seventeenth busiest container ports in Europe (Table 2), their cargo-handling capacities 
5  See the introduction of the Switzerland trade agreements, 
http://www.s-ge.com/switzerland/export/en/content/static/Free-Trade-Agreements. A current overview of Swiss trade 
agreements can be found at: https://www.seco.admin.ch/seco/en/home/Aussenwirtschaftspolitik_Wirtschaftliche_
Zusammenarbeit/Wirtschaftsbeziehungen/Freihandelsabkommen/Liste_der_Freihandelsabkommen_der_Schweiz.html.
6  See EFTA, ‘Free Movement of Goods’, http://www.efta.int/media/publications/fact-sheets/EEA-factsheets/Goods-
FactSheet.pdf. 
7  Also see BBC News, ‘Five models for post-Brexit UK trade’, http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-eu-referen-
dum-36639261.
8  See Alicia Garcia Herrero and Jianwei Xu, ‘China’s Belt and Road Initiative: Can Europe expect any trade gains?’, 
http://bruegel.org/2016/09/chinas-belt-and-road-initiative-can-europe-expect-trade-gains/ 
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is relatively limited. Therefore, detours for goods from China via the UK before they enter 
other EU countries would be not realistic in the short run. Even if the handling capacity of 
UK ports is increased in the future, a company using the UK as a back door to the EU would 
incur a non-negligible transportation cost to their final destination, whether by maritime or 
other transportation modes. According to our calculation, based on the World Input-Output 
(WIOD) database, the share of international transport costs in total inputs for both intermedi-
ate and final goods is approximately 4 to 5 percent for most EU countries (Figure 1), while the 
average Most Favoured Nation (MFN) rate for Europe is already as low as 1.5 percent9. There-
fore, in international trade terms, transportation costs seem to be more important than tariffs. 
Thus, the additional transportation cost of a detour via the UK for Chinese goods destined for 
the EU would at least partly offset the intended tariff saving to make the UK back door a less 
profitable choice. 
Table 1: COSCO European and Trans-Atlantic service routes
COSCO’s main route service codes European ports
Asia-Mediterranean Route
AMX8 Malta, Rijeka, Koper, Trieste, Venice
BEX Piraeus, Ambarli, Constanze, Odessa
FEM Piraeus
AMX1 La Spezia, Genova, Fos, Valencia
MD1 Piraeus, Genoa
MD2 La Spezia, Genova, Fos, Valencia
MD3 Malta, La Spezia, Genova, Valancia
MEX1 Malta, Fos, Barcelona, Valancia
Asia-North Europe Route
AEX1 Felixstowe, Rotterdam, Hamburg
FAL1
Algeciras, Dunkirk, Southampton, Felixstowe, 
Rotterdam, Hamburg
FAL3
Le Havre, Antwerp, Rotterdam, Hamburg, 
Felixstowe
NE2 Piraeus, Antwerp, Rotterdam, Hamburg, Felixstowe
NE3 Antwerp, Rotterdam, Hamburg
NE5 Rotterdam, Hamburg, Felixstowe
NE6 Algeciras, Rotterdam, Hamburg
NE7 Piraeus, Antwerp, Rotterdam, Hamburg, Felixstowe
Source: Bruegel based on China Ocean Shipping Company (COSCO), http://www.coscon.com/, as of 27 September 2016.
9  The statistics for tariffs are taken from the World Bank WDI database. The applied weighted average tariffs for the 
European Union are 1.09 percent, 1.02 percent, 1.04 percent and 1.51 percent from 2011 to 2014.  
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Table 2: Europe’s busiest ports
Rank in Europe Port State
1000 TEU (Twenty-feet 
equivalent units, 2014)
1 Rotterdam Netherlands 12,298
2 Hamburg Germany 9,729
3 Antwerp Belgium 8,978
4 Bremerhaven Germany 5,796
5 Algeciras Spain 4,555
6 Valencia Spain 4,442
7 Felixstowe United Kingdom 3,700
8 Piraeus Greece 3,585
9 Ambarli/Istanbul Turkey 3,600
10 Gioia Tauro Italy 2,970
Source: Report from the Port of Rotterdam. https://www.portofrotterdam.com/en/files/top-20-european-container-ports. 
Figure 1: International transport costs, share of total foreign inputs
Source: Bruegel based on WIOD database.
3. An FTA with China would benefit the UK in 
the Chinese market, particularly for the ‘motor 
cars and vehicles’ sector
China is the second largest destination for EU exports, accounting for 9.5 percent of the EU’s 
total exports. If a China-UK FTA was reached, the UK would undoubtedly gain competitive 
advantage in terms of access to the Chinese market. Would the improved UK-China economic 
collaboration affect the EU’s exports? 
To understand the possible implications of a China-UK FTA, it is straightforward to 
compare the EU’s and the UK’s export structures. Figure 2 decomposes the UK’s exports 
into capital goods, consumer goods, intermediate goods and raw materials, and compares 
them to those of the rest of the EU10. Consumer goods constitute the largest share of the 
10  To do this, we use a concordance from WITS: http://wits.worldbank.org/referencedata.html.
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to the UK in this category is Germany, whose exports make up more than 50 percent of the 
EU’s total exports in this product category. The auto category is also important for Slovakia. 
Although its share is only 5.23 percent, it is nonetheless an important industry given that it is 
the country’s largest industry and accounts for 12 percent of its GDP12. Because the current 
importing MFN rate to China is 25 percent, once the UK strikes an FTA with China, UK export-
ers in this category could expect  a big cut to their bilateral tariffs. 
However, this trade benefit might be less promising than it seems. Most UK car manufac-
turing is foreign owned, and its continued presence in the UK could be very dependent on the 
UK keeping or losing its single market membership. If the UK exits the single market, these 
foreign investors could divert their investment to other EU countries, minimising the impact 
of a UK-China trade deal. Instead, if the UK were to continue to have single market access13, 
a China-UK FTA could harm other EU countries’ competitiveness in the automobile sector, 
with Germany and Slovakia being especially affected.
Table 3: UK share of EU exports to China compared to its main EU competitors, 
selected categories
Source: Bruegel. 
Another potentially important product category is ‘internal combustion engines’, which 
ranks as the UK’s seventh most valuable export category to the Chinese market. The UK and 
Germany compete strongly in this sector, with each taking more than 40 percent of EU market 
share in China. Given that the MFN tariff for the product is 8.26 percent, a possible China-UK 
FTA would also facilitate the UK’s competitiveness in China and could have some negative 
effect on Germany. 
The spillover effects for the other products are expected to be small. The UK’s second 
largest export product is ‘gold’, making up more than 17 percent by value of the UK’s exports 
to China. However, because the MFN tariff for this product in China is zero, there is already no 
room for further reduction. 
The third largest product category is ‘medicaments’, which makes up 4.51 percent of the 
12  ‘Automotive industry in Slovakia’, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Automotive_industry_in_Slovakia.
13  Similarly to Norway, which through the European Free Trade Association can sign trade deals with other 
countries.
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Germany 51.67% 0.10% 23.41% 0.00% 20.71% 3.07% 40.10% 8.57% 42.22% 54.85%
Spain 0.04% 0.00% 2.71% 0.00% 7.04% 7.62% 0.15% 0.13% 0.00% 0.92%
France 0.57% 0.03% 10.11% 0.00% 5.45% 5.80% 2.25% 61.76% 0.01% 20.69%
United 
Kingdom
29.21% 99.87% 17.54% 99.98% 22.66% 45.82% 44.80% 14.51% 46.04% 18.74%
Italy 3.11% 0.00% 10.20% 0.00% 6.75% 11.49% 3.60% 6.01% 6.04% 0.92%
Netherland 0.47% 0.00% 2.92% 0.00% 19.03% 17.05% 0.46% 2.80% 0.02% 0.74%
Slovakia 5.23% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.10% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.01%
Sweden 0.85% 0.00% 12.75% 0.00% 1.92% 0.03% 4.50% 0.80% 0.07% 0.04%
MFN tariffs 25.00% 0.00% 5.11% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 8.26% 2.67% 0.75% 0.75%
UK’s exports to China (45 percent), followed by intermediate goods (25 percent), whereas 
the consumer goods share for the rest of the EU is 25 percent and the intermediate goods 
share is only 17 percent. The EU mainly exports capital goods to China, with a share of 46 
percent of total exports, but the capital goods share makes up only 16 percent of the UK’s 
total exports to China. In this sense, the UK’s export composition is distinctly different to 
that of the rest of the EU. 
We next move to the product structure of the UK’s exports in comparison to those of other 
EU countries. Figure 3 reports the UK’s top ten product categories exported to China. These 
products constitute 70 percent of the UK’s exports to China. In Table 3, we compare these top 
exports to those of the UK’s major competitors in the EU. To see the potential of a China-UK 
FTA, we also report the current MFN tariffs for these products.
Figure 2: Composition of exports from the UK and the rest of the EU to China
Source: Bruegel.
Figure 3: The UK’s top ten exports to China as a % of EU exports to China in each 
category
Source: Bruegel based on the OECD bilateral database.
The most important export category from the UK to China is ‘motor cars & vehicles’11, 
which alone accounts for 35.2 percent of the UK’s exports to China. The major competitor 
11  We use HS4 product classifications for analysis. All the terms are shortened for ease of reading. 
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to the UK in this category is Germany, whose exports make up more than 50 percent of the 
EU’s total exports in this product category. The auto category is also important for Slovakia. 
Although its share is only 5.23 percent, it is nonetheless an important industry given that it is 
the country’s largest industry and accounts for 12 percent of its GDP12. Because the current 
importing MFN rate to China is 25 percent, once the UK strikes an FTA with China, UK export-
ers in this category could expect  a big cut to their bilateral tariffs. 
However, this trade benefit might be less promising than it seems. Most UK car manufac-
turing is foreign owned, and its continued presence in the UK could be very dependent on the 
UK keeping or losing its single market membership. If the UK exits the single market, these 
foreign investors could divert their investment to other EU countries, minimising the impact 
of a UK-China trade deal. Instead, if the UK were to continue to have single market access13, 
a China-UK FTA could harm other EU countries’ competitiveness in the automobile sector, 
with Germany and Slovakia being especially affected.
Table 3: UK share of EU exports to China compared to its main EU competitors, 
selected categories
Source: Bruegel. 
Another potentially important product category is ‘internal combustion engines’, which 
ranks as the UK’s seventh most valuable export category to the Chinese market. The UK and 
Germany compete strongly in this sector, with each taking more than 40 percent of EU market 
share in China. Given that the MFN tariff for the product is 8.26 percent, a possible China-UK 
FTA would also facilitate the UK’s competitiveness in China and could have some negative 
effect on Germany. 
The spillover effects for the other products are expected to be small. The UK’s second 
largest export product is ‘gold’, making up more than 17 percent by value of the UK’s exports 
to China. However, because the MFN tariff for this product in China is zero, there is already no 
room for further reduction. 
The third largest product category is ‘medicaments’, which makes up 4.51 percent of the 
12  ‘Automotive industry in Slovakia’, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Automotive_industry_in_Slovakia.
13  Similarly to Norway, which through the European Free Trade Association can sign trade deals with other 
countries.
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Spain 0.04% 0.00% 2.71% 0.00% 7.04% 7.62% 0.15% 0.13% 0.00% 0.92%
France 0.57% 0.03% 10.11% 0.00% 5.45% 5.80% 2.25% 61.76% 0.01% 20.69%
United 
Kingdom
29.21% 99.87% 17.54% 99.98% 22.66% 45.82% 44.80% 14.51% 46.04% 18.74%
Italy 3.11% 0.00% 10.20% 0.00% 6.75% 11.49% 3.60% 6.01% 6.04% 0.92%
Netherland 0.47% 0.00% 2.92% 0.00% 19.03% 17.05% 0.46% 2.80% 0.02% 0.74%
Slovakia 5.23% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.10% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.01%
Sweden 0.85% 0.00% 12.75% 0.00% 1.92% 0.03% 4.50% 0.80% 0.07% 0.04%
MFN tariffs 25.00% 0.00% 5.11% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 8.26% 2.67% 0.75% 0.75%
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would have differing impacts across a variety of consumer goods categories, depending on 
the specific tariffs that currently apply. The second column of Table 4 reports the related 
MFN tariffs for the UK’s top five categories of consumer goods imports from China. It can be 
seen that the greatest impact might come from ‘sweaters, pullovers and vests’, for which the 
current MFN tariff reaches nearly 12 percent. But for the other sectors, the MFN tariffs are 
quite limited so the benefit from an FTA would be small. This is especially so for the ‘lamp 
and lighting fittings’ category for which the MFN tariff is already zero percent so there would 
be no possible effect arising from an FTA. As such, an FTA could be only relevant for specific 
consumer goods sectors.
Figure 5: The UK’s top ten imports from China, as % of total imports from China
The distribution of capital goods is more concentrated. Figure 5 shows that the top three 
product categories that the UK imports from China, ‘industrial furnaces & ovens, non-elec-
tronic products’ (9.51 percent) , ‘apparatus for radio, telephone and camera’ (4.96 percent), 
‘electronic apparatus for telephone’ (2.78 percent), are all capital goods. However, for these 
three product categories, the average MFN tariff rates are 0.00 percent, 2.90 percent and 0.00 
percent respectively, implying that there would be nearly no potential for these major capital 
goods from further reductions in tariffs. 
Table 4: MFN tariffs for UK’s top five imported consumer, capital and intermediate 
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UK’s exports to China. Although there are several countries competing in this product cate-
gory, including Belgium (8.47 percent share of EU exports to China in this category), Germany 
(23.41 percent), France (10.11 percent), Italy (10.20 percent) and Sweden (12.75 percent), the 
current MFN tariff rate is 5.11 percent and there would be limited room for tariff reduction. As 
such, a China-UK FTA would only have a moderate effect on this product category. 
The UK’s next three top export products, ‘crude oil’, ‘copper waste and scrap’, and ‘chemical 
wood pulp’, make up a significant share of the EU’s exports to China. However, the MFN rate is 
again zero percent, so there would be no spillover effect arising from the China-UK FTA. For 
the UK’s other top export products, the MFN tariff is also very low, so the possible FTA would 
offer little gain to the UK’s firms on the Chinese market.
All in all, if the UK can maintain some form of single market status with the EU, a 
China-UK FTA could be expected to produce huge benefits in favour of the UK’s ‘motor 
cars & vehicles’ sector. This would undoubtedly have a significantly negative influence 
on German and Slovakian auto exports to China. In addition, German export sales of the 
product category ‘internal combustion engines’ would be jeopardised. For the rest of the 
product categories, the spillover effect would be moderate at most.
4. The reduced costs of UK imports, 
thanks to an FTA with China, would be at 
most moderate
The UK’s imports from China are also mostly concentrated on consumer goods. Within the 
EU, the UK is after Germany the second largest end importer of consumer goods from China. 
Consumer goods from China account for more than half of the UK’s total imported goods 
from China by value (53 percent). In comparison, the values of capital and intermediate 
goods are 22 percent and 16 percent respectively of the UK’s imports from China, below the 
average level for the rest of the EU. 
Figure 4: Capital, intermediate and consumer goods imported from China by the UK 
and the rest of the EU
  Source: Bruegel.
Although the UK relies more on consumer goods in its imports from China, the distribu-
tion of these goods is broad based. Even the largest consumer goods category, ‘furniture and 
its parts’, makes up only 2.36 percent of China’s exports to the UK. Therefore slicing tariffs 
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would have differing impacts across a variety of consumer goods categories, depending on 
the specific tariffs that currently apply. The second column of Table 4 reports the related 
MFN tariffs for the UK’s top five categories of consumer goods imports from China. It can be 
seen that the greatest impact might come from ‘sweaters, pullovers and vests’, for which the 
current MFN tariff reaches nearly 12 percent. But for the other sectors, the MFN tariffs are 
quite limited so the benefit from an FTA would be small. This is especially so for the ‘lamp 
and lighting fittings’ category for which the MFN tariff is already zero percent so there would 
be no possible effect arising from an FTA. As such, an FTA could be only relevant for specific 
consumer goods sectors.
Figure 5: The UK’s top ten imports from China, as % of total imports from China
The distribution of capital goods is more concentrated. Figure 5 shows that the top three 
product categories that the UK imports from China, ‘industrial furnaces & ovens, non-elec-
tronic products’ (9.51 percent) , ‘apparatus for radio, telephone and camera’ (4.96 percent), 
‘electronic apparatus for telephone’ (2.78 percent), are all capital goods. However, for these 
three product categories, the average MFN tariff rates are 0.00 percent, 2.90 percent and 0.00 
percent respectively, implying that there would be nearly no potential for these major capital 
goods from further reductions in tariffs. 
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Intermediate goods have received global attention in modern international trade. 
Undoubtedly the reduction in tariffs can have certain implications for sectors that depend 
more on imported intermediates. The UK’s Brexit minister David Davis has argued that an 
FTA with China will reduce the intermediate cost of car components and increase the UK 
car sector’s global competitiveness. However, according to our estimates, only eight percent 
of the UK’s imports from China fall into the intermediate goods category, so the final effect 
is expected to be small. The last column of Table 4 shows the MFN tariffs for the UK’s top 
intermediate goods imports from China. It can be seen that the MFN tariffs for most products 
in this category are already very low. Though there are very high rates for certain categories, 
such as ‘knitted and crocheted fabrics’, the trade volumes for these product categories are low, 
making up less than one percent of the UK’s total imports. In particular, the MFN tariff for 
the parts and accessories of motor vehicles is as low as 3.81 percent. Against this backdrop, 
even if China and the UK succeed in striking a zero-tariff agreement for these intermediate 
goods, the impact on the price of final goods would be far less than four percent. Therefore, a 
China-UK FTA would have very moderate impact, if any, on the UK’s global competitiveness 
from the intermediate goods perspective.
5 Policy recommendations
A China-UK free trade agreement has been extensively discussed since the UK’s vote for Brex-
it. Many supporters of Brexit argue that the UK’s regained flexibility to strike trade deals with 
other partners, and in particular with China given its economic size, will be a key advantage. 
Our analysis indicates that a China-UK FTA will be neither as easy nor as clearly advanta-
geous as portrayed by Brexit supporters. First, it will be very difficult for the UK to reach an 
agreement with China without first establishing a new post-Brexit partnership with the EU. 
Negotiating independent MFN tariffs with other WTO members will be a pre-condition if the 
UK exits the EU customs union, and this process will require time and effort. Second, even 
if the UK reaches an agreement with China, the UK cannot serve as a back door for Chinese 
products to enter the EU, because the EU is very likely use rules of origin to close any such 
loopholes. In addition, entering the EU via the UK will entail an additional transportation cost 
that will, at least partly, offset any tariff savings, making use of such a loophole less worth-
while. Third, the UK and the other EU economies differ in most of their imports and exports, 
so there would be very limited substitution between them. Even for the product categories in 
which the UK and the EU compete on the Chinese market, current MFN tariffs are already too 
low for there to be further sizable reductions. The only exception is the ‘motor cars & vehi-
cles’ category, in terms of which the UK, Germany and Slovakia do compete on the Chinese 
market. It is possible that the UK might gain some advantage were a UK-China trade deal 
to be signed. However, the cost for the UK might be high, because such a deal could end up 
creating obstacles for the UK’s current most important trade partnership, namely the one it 
has with the EU.
It therefore seems to us that establishing a new trade relationship with the EU would be 
a more urgent task for the UK in the post-Brexit world, than an FTA with China. Under such 
circumstances, the UK might need to postpone its trade negotiations with other economies 
outside of EU, including China. This goes beyond the current discussion of the illegality of 
the UK starting to negotiate trade deals before it leaves the EU. The issue is whether it makes 
economic sense for the UK to do so, and the answer is no. In fact, the more the UK reaches 
an independent favourable trade agreement with China after Brexit, the harder it will be for 
the UK to strike a good deal with EU. In the meantime, it is also urgent for the UK to negotiate 
with the main WTO members on MFN tariffs, because outside the EU, the UK might not par-
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ticipate in the EU schedule of concessions. The best strategy for the UK would be to negotiate 
with the other WTO members with the EU-based tariffs as a starting point, to avoid negotiat-
ing over terms separately and aalso to maintain a close relationship with the EU.
In general, the EU should not be too concerned by a potential China-UK FTA. After all, the 
overall EU-China trade pattern differs from the UK-China trade pattern. Even if the UK can 
maintain its EU single market status to the EU, as long as the EU includes rules of origin in its 
trade negotiations with the UK, there would be at most a limited substitution effect in certain 
sectors, such as motor vehicles, and this would mainly affect Germany and Slovakia. The 
overall impact would be very moderate. Therefore, when establishing the new trade relation-
ship with the UK, the EU does not need to overplay the significance of the China-UK factor, 
and can focus more on its internal priorities.
